

## The Intentionality of Actions and the Intentionality of Omissions

Katarzyna Paprzycka

University of Warsaw

We do some things intentionally. Sometimes we also intentionally fail to do things. Whether or not omissions are actions, it is natural to think that the concept of intentionality in both cases is the same, that it has something to do with intention, though not necessarily with intention to do what one intentionally does (Bratman) or omits to do (Clarke).

I call both assumptions into question by adopting a normative theory of omissions (Feinberg, Smith, Williams). I partially defend it by showing that the normative theorist has good reasons to claim that the intentionality of omissions presupposes knowledge rather than intention. The structure of intentionality in the case of an intentional action involves the agent's carrying out a commitment she has undertaken (in intending to do something) while the structure of intentionality in the case of an intentional omission paradigmatically involves the agent's failing to carry out an external commitment, which she only acknowledges.

I argue that adopting this picture helps us to explain some recalcitrant problems in philosophy of action. It helps to explain the Knobe effect and the Butler problem. It also helps to explain the underlying conceptual connections between intentionality and foreseeability as well as (partially) between intentionality and chance (Harman). We can thus understand why the intentionality of the akratic action does not require intention. Finally, the account of the dual nature of intentionality is a first step toward explaining the multiplicity of conceptions of intentional action.